The aim of this paper is to confront Emmanuel Levinas' ethics of responsibility with the philosophy of mutual recognition (reconnaissance mutuelle) that Paul Ricoeur has developed in his last book, The Course of Recognition. In this confrontation, the concept of communication will serve as a guide, since it seems well suited to help introducing the central ideas of both authors, as well as to mark the point of disagreement between them.
and Infinity (II). As will be shown in the third part, this problem is the focus of Ricoeur's critique of Levinas, as he has articulated it especially in Oneself as Another (III) . Taking this critique as an introduction to Ricoeur's own conception of the relation between the self and the other, his philosophy of recognition is presented in the fourth part of this paper (IV). In this context, the question will have to be discussed whether it is possible, as Ricoeur claims, to "integrate" the dissymmetry which Levinas shows to mark the ethical relation, within a relation of mutual recognition. Returning to the theme of language and communication, then, the fifth part examines to what extent Levinas' conception of language as a paradigm of a "non-allergic" relation to the other (as presented in Totality and Infinity) can be related to Ricoeur's notion of the gift (le don) (V). Finally, Ricoeur's notion of "linguistic hospitality" (hospitalité langagière) will be compared with Levinas' notion of hospitality or "welcome" (accueil), in order to specify in what sense communication contains not only a risk, but also a promise: namely, the promise of a peaceful, creative exchange between interlocutors who do not thereby merge in the unity of a common identity, but still remain others for one another (VI).
"A Fine Risk to be Run": Levinas on Communication
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas characterizes communication as "a fine risk to be run" (un beau risque à courir).2 This telling expression makes it clear that for him, communication does not primarily serve the function of transmitting messages or pieces of information, as in classical communication theory. Nor is its main purpose to establish an understanding or agreement about certain norms or matters of fact by exchanging arguments, as in Platonic dialogue or in Habermas' theory of "communicative action" and of consensus-oriented "discourse." For Levinas, what is essential about communication is the "opening" or the "overture" (ouverture) of communication,3 that is the act or rather the event (passively experienced by whoever is addressed or spoken to) of entering into a relation with an interlocutor, which implies an openness or opening up towards the other. This opening of communication presents a risk insofar as it is not warranted by the regular functioning of any "language game" or "discourse" (in the sense
